We develop analytical properties of the Heteroscedastic Exponomial Choice (HEC) model to increase its appeal for building demand models in analytical and empirical research. HEC generalizes the Exponomial Choice model to accommodate choice-specific variances for the random components of utility (the error terms) in a discrete choice setting, which is analytically intractable for logit. The choice probabilities under HEC can be expressed in closed form as an exponomial, a linear function of exponential terms. The elasticity of choice probabilities and the expected consumer surplus also have closed-form, remarkably simple expressions. The HEC loglikelihood function is a concave function of the parameters of a linear utility model for a given set of error term distribution parameters (rates of the corresponding exponential distributions).
Introduction
Demand modeling is a cornerstone of theoretical research in economics (Tirole 1988 ) and many business disciplines, such as operations management (Talluri and van Ryzin 2004) and marketing (Lilien et al. 1992 ). Discrete choice theory constitutes one of the major building blocks for demand modeling (van Ryzin 2014, Anderson et al. 1992) . Within this branch of demand modeling, logit offers practically the only family of models that is analytically appealing as well as empirically versatile. Starting with the axioms of Luce (1959) and continuing with the seminal contributions of McFadden that earned him the Nobel in economics (McFadden 2001) , there accumulated a vast amount of theoretical and empirical literature that use the logit framework.
In this paper we study a discrete choice model that holds promise in terms of offering an alternative to the logit framework in demand modeling: the Heteroscedastic Exponomial Choice (HEC) model. HEC was first proposed by Daganzo (1979, pp. 14-16) . It remained largely obscure, save one major empirical test (Currim 1982) , until one recent study. Alptekinoğlu and Semple (2016) use the independent and identically distributed (iid) error version of this model, which they dub Exponomial Choice (EC), in pricing and assortment planning contexts. They show, among other things, that the EC loglikelihood function is concave for linear model specifications, which makes model estimation very convenient. HEC generalizes EC to accommodate choice-specific variances for the random components of utility, or, the error terms in a discrete choice setting (such generalization is analytically intractable for logit). In particular, we assume that the error terms follow independent but not identical exponential distributions, and that they are subtracted from the deterministic component of utility.
The purpose of this research is to make a case for utilizing HEC in empirical and analytical research that build demand models on a discrete choice foundation. To this end, we develop several analytical properties of HEC and explore its pricing implications. The HEC model's choice probabilities can be expressed in closed form as an exponomial, a linear function of exponential terms. The elasticity of choice probabilities and the expected consumer surplus also have closedform, remarkably simple expressions. The HEC loglikelihood function is a concave function of the parameters of a linear utility model for a given set of error term distribution parameters (rates of the corresponding exponential distributions). Moreover, the HEC model can easily accommodate an outside option with a deterministic utility (no random error term), which is quite cumbersome to do in a logit framework. Deterministic outside option also allows choices with zero probability, which is impossible in the logit framework. Finally, we also derive optimal prices under monopoly (of a multi-product firm) and oligopoly (of single-product firms). We also explore how the variance of error terms impact the optimal or equilibrium prices.
In sum, the analytical properties we develop in this paper contribute to building a case for utilizing HEC in empirical and analytical research that build demand models on a discrete choice foundation. We first define the HEC model in §2, present its analytical properties, and extend it to deterministic outside option. Next, in §3, we present pricing results under monopoly and oligopoly.
In §2.4 we explore the maximum loglikelihood estimation of HEC. We then close the paper in §4 with a discussion of future research. (All proofs are in the appendix.)
The Heteroscedastic Exponomial Choice Model
Consider n choices (n ≥ 2), let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the choice set, and suppose a random consumer c derives utility
from choice i ∈ N , where u i is the ideal utility of choice i, and z ic is an exponentially distributed random variable with rate λ i > 0. The random terms z ic are independent (but not identical) across consumers and choices; they capture preference heterogeneity among consumers. Let f i denote the probability density function (pdf ) and F i the cumulative distribution function (cdf ) of z ic , i.e., f i (z) = λ i e −λ i z and F i (z) = 1 − e −λ i z for z ≥ 0, and f j (z) = F j (z) = 0 for z < 0.
The probability that the consumer chooses i ∈ N (we henceforth drop the consumer subscript c to improve readability)
can be derived in closed-form using the rank-ordering of ideal utilities. Let [j] denote the choiceout of the set N -with the j-th smallest ideal utility. That is, the n choices under consideration have the following rank-ordering in ideal utilities: u [1] ≤ u [2] ≤ · · · ≤ u [n] . Define L [j] ≡ n k=j λ [k] and
for j = 1, . . . , n. Note that λ [j] refers to the error distribution parameter for choice [j] , not the j-th smallest λ.
Theorem 1. (Heteroscedastic Exponomial Choice Probabilities) Out of n choices with
utilities U i = u i − z i , where the error terms z i follow independent exponential distributions with corresponding rate λ i , the probability that the consumer prefers choice [j] considering it as utilitymaximizing over all choices, for some j ∈ N , is
These choice probabilities have the form of an exponomial -a linear function of exponential terms. They were first stated without proof by Daganzo (1979, p. 15) ; for completeness we include the proof. Unlike in MNL (multinomial logit), heteroscedasticity is thus tractable. An additional analytical convenience HEC has over MNL and its vast number of variations is the fact that exponential terms appear in an additive form. One comparative disadvantage, however, is the fact that rank-ordering of ideal utilities matters. Despite that, we show in this paper that HEC possesses many attractive analytical properties.
In the remainder of this section we discuss the demand model that HEC implies and its various analytical properties.
Basic Properties of HEC
The choice probabilities in (3) should obviously sum to 1. To see this, note that the coefficients of . . . , Q [n] sum to zero; the only term that remains after summing
, which equals 1 using (2), i.e.,
The HEC choice probabilities may also be expressed in a recursive fashion. Writing out the
G [k] , and multiplying both sides by
, we obtain
for j = 1, . . . , n − 1. Using only (3), we have a second recursive relationship:
A more explicit version of this -without employing the G functions -is
where the right-hand-side is independent of λ [1] , . . . , λ [j] . It is immediate from (6) that
. This has two important implications. First, the choice probabilities [·] ratio is preserved at transition points where the ideal utility ranks do change. Second, when every choice has the same ideal utility (u i = u ∀i), the choice probability formula (3) reduces to
, in which case the choice probabilities are obviously free of ideal utility ranks, i.e., they can be expressed as
. This is also the probability that choice i has the smallest error term.
Unlike the EC model (with iid error terms), the choice probabilities may not be monotone increasing in the ideal utility parameters but they satisfy another type of monotonicity. The G functions defined in (2) must satisfy
Therefore, equation (5) and inequality (7) together imply
for all j = 1, . . . , n − 1 (this can also be verified from (6) and u [j] ≤ u [j+1] ). That is, the ratio [j] is monotone increasing in j. 
, then the choice probabilities themselves are monotone increasing, i.e.,
. This condition makes intuitive sense: Higher-quality products typically have a better reputation; it is thus quite plausible that they would have error terms with smaller mean and variance as their ideal utility would not get discounted as much by consumers. Note that
The monotonicity of choice probabilities can thus be violated only if a product with higher ideal utility has a larger variance in its error term. Consider the two examples shown in Table 1 .
Consumers are presented with three products indexed in increasing order of ideal utility ([i] = i ∀i).
On the left-hand-side the error terms of all products are iid (λ i = 1 ∀i), which results in monotone increasing choice probabilities. On the right-hand-side, product 1 is made "safer" by increasing the rate of its error term 10-fold (λ 1 = 10), and product 3 is made "riskier" by doing the opposite (λ 3 = 0.1). Product 3 no longer commands the highest choice probability. In fact, quite the opposite:
Finally, we have two results on the behavior the choice probabilities as a function of ideal utilities. First, the local logconcavity of EC choice probabilities (Alptekinoğlu and Semple 2016, see Lemma 3 in Online Supplement) easily carries over to the HEC model.
Lemma 1. (Local Logconcavity)
The HEC choice probabilities, Q [j] , are each a logconcave function of the ideal utilities provided that their rank-ordering
Second, unlike the choice probabilities indexed by rank-ordered ideal utilities, the choice probabilities indexed by the choices themselves are actually smooth functions despite the complications raised by the fact that the choice probability formula (3) depends on how ideal utilities rank. While these two structural properties might also be of general interest, they play an important part in our pricing ( §3) and estimation ( §2.4) results.
Elasticity of Demand in HEC
Unlike in MNL, the elasticity of choice probabilities with respect to ideal utilities is not a constant in HEC. First, taking the derivative of the G function, we obtain
(setting L [n+1] to zero by convention). Now, taking the derivative of choice probabilities in (3) and writing the resulting expressions in terms of the G and Q functions, we obtain
Therefore, the elasticity of the choice probability Q [j] is
Take three products with ideal utility ranks j < k < l. Comparing the elasticities of Q [j] and Q [l] with respect to the ideal utility of product [k], we observe that E
follows from (8) and (11), and E Blattberg and Wisniewski (1989) . In contrast, the MNL model predicts constant cross elasticities (Anderson et al. 1992, p. 44) , that is, E
u [k] can never occur under MNL.
Consumer Surplus in HEC
Setting the marginal utility of income to 1 for simplicity of exposition, the consumer surplus under HEC can be defined as S ≡ max 
This is a simple and intuitive formula. For example, if all choices are identical, i.e., u i = u and λ i = λ for all i, then the expected consumer surplus equals u − 1/(λn), which is increasing in n and approaching an asymptotic limit of u as n → ∞. More generally, if all choices have the same ideal utility (u i = u) and error terms with different variances, then the expected consumer surplus
. It is clear from this expression that higher variety (adding more choices with the same ideal utility u) or lower variance in the error terms (increasing λ i for any existing choice i) improves consumer surplus, as both would increase L [1] . Also, very low variance in the error term of the choice with the highest ideal utility (very high λ [n] ) means that the expected consumer surplus is determined almost exclusively by the highest ideal utility (u [n] ). Note that, because Q [n] ≤ 1, the expected consumer surplus is higher than the average utility of the choice with the highest ideal
The closed-form expected consumer surplus formula in (12) makes it easier to understand which choices are worth improving-from a consumer welfare standpoint. Taking the derivative of CS with respect to the ideal utility of choice [j] , we obtain
Therefore, improving the most popular choice (one that has the highest choice probability) improves the expected consumer surplus the most 1 . Recall that, under HEC, the most popular choice may not coincide with the choice that offers the highest ideal utility. So, it may be that it is better to improve a choice that is worse in its ideal utility but also less risky (has an error term with less variance). An example would be product 2 (versus product 3) in Table 1 .
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Ideal Utilities in HEC
Building on Lemmas 1 and 2, in this subsection we establish the concavity of the HEC loglikelihood function in model parameters. To that end, we first need to formally define the HEC loglikelihood function.
Suppose consumers are offered a set of products S k in choice scenario k. Let n k i represent the number of consumers who chose product i in choice scenario k (i ∈ S k ). Assume product i's ideal utility in choice scenario k, u k i (γ), is a linear function of its unknown parameters, represented by the vector γ. Let Q k i denote the probability that a consumer chooses product i in choice scenario k (full definition remains the same as in (1)). We maintain the notational convention that [j] refers to the product with the j-th lowest ideal utility; that is, Q k [j] denotes the probability that a consumer chooses product [j] in choice scenario k, which has the j-th lowest ideal utility among all u k i (γ)
With consumers exposed to K choice scenarios, S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S K , the loglikelihood function is
which captures the probability of observing the data n k i for i ∈ S k and k = 1, . The proof hinges on a key factoid: As a choice makes transitions between ideal utility ranks, say due to an optimization routine varying any of the model parameters (γ), the choice probability and its logarithm remain differentiable even at the transition points (Lemma 2). That is, ln Q k i is a smooth function of γ. Any standard optimization package can therefore be used to maximize the HEC loglikelihood for a given set of λ's. This fortunate feature of the HEC model may appear surprising due to the discrete nature of the ideal utility rankings. The following numerical example illustrates the result and the basic idea behind it.
Numerical Example 1. Consider 4 choices with ideal utilities u i = i and error term parameters
Varying u 1 from 0 to 5, we graph in Figure 1 the natural logarithm of the choice probability for choice i, i.e., ln(Q i ) for all i. Note, for example, that choice 1 has the lowest ideal utility on the interval u 1 ∈ [0, 2), the second lowest ideal utility on [2, 3), and so on.
Even though its ideal utility rank changes from one segment to the next, these four segments do trace out a smooth concave curve. As mentioned earlier, the reason is that even at the transition points where a choice's ideal utility rank changes, the choice probability and its natural logarithm remain differentiable.
Extension to Deterministic Outside Option
The choice set in the base HEC model can include an outside option, which would need to have a random error term (with its own rate parameter λ), just like all the other choices. In this subsection we show how HEC can easily incorporate a deterministic outside option.
Consider n products and an outside option. Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of products, and N + = N ∪ {0} the expanded choice set that includes the outside option. Suppose product i ∈ N yields a random utility U i = u i − z i , exactly as defined in the beginning of §2, whereas, the outside option yields a deterministic utility of u 0 . Consumers are looking to purchase one of the n products or choose the outside option, which could represent purchasing none of the products in N but rather some other product (say, a competitor's), or it could represent opting for a default, well-known alternative (like, doing nothing) whose utility has no uncertainty. The probability that the consumer chooses product i ∈ N is
and the probability that the consumer chooses the outside option is
We assume without loss of generality that all n products are "better" than the outside option in the sense of having a higher ideal utility, i.e., u i > u 0 for all i ∈ N . If there were products with lower ideal utility than u 0 , then their choice probability would be zero (see 15) and they could be eliminated from consideration. This does not imply anything about how average utilities compare;
there may exist products with an average utility (u i − 1/λ i ) that is higher or lower than u 0 .
As with the base HEC model, rank-ordering of ideal utilities matters in the derivation of choice probabilities. Let [j] denote the product -out of the set N -with the j-th smallest ideal utility.
That is, the n products under consideration have the following rank-ordering in ideal utilities:
λ [k] and G [j] for the product in ideal-utility rank j ∈ N just as before in (2), and define
for the outside option. Again, note that λ [j] refers to the error distribution parameter for product [j] , not the j-th smallest λ.
Theorem 4. Under the HEC model with a deterministic outside option, the probability that the consumer chooses product [j] is
for j ∈ N , and the probability that the consumer chooses the outside option is
A few remarks are in order. First, the HEC monotonicity property still holds among the n
The proof, which we omit, is very similar. Second, the outside option steals demand from each product proportional to the product's "error rate." In particular, consumers switching away from product [j] to the outside
in (17)). Third, it is is easy to see how the choice probabilities vary as the outside option improves.
The first-and second-order derivatives of Q [j] ∂Q [j] 
reveal that Q [j] are concave decreasing in u 0 (as long as the assumption u 0 < u [1] remains valid).
Fourth, as u 0 approaches u [1] from below, the choice probability for the product with the smallest ideal utility
approaches zero from above.
In closing, it is fairly easy to incorporate a deterministic outside option in HEC. Whereas in MNL, it is a very cumbersome undertaking (Anderson et al. 1992, p. 235) , and not very common in analytical or empirical literature. Possibly more importantly, adding a deterministic outside option in HEC allows modeling choices with zero probability, whereas MNL choice probabilities are always strictly positive.
Pricing under HEC
In this section we study pricing under a demand model built on HEC. We consider two canonical settings: a multiproduct monopoly, and an oligopoly of single-product firms. Throughout, we assume that the ideal utility of product i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} is linear in its price p i , i.e.,
The intercept α i captures all non-price related factors and measures the intrinsic desirability of the product, i.e., the ideal utility of product i at p i = 0. The coefficient β > 0 captures the price sensitivity of consumers.
Recall our notation linking the ideal utility rank of a product to its index: [j] denotes the choice with the j-th smallest ideal utility out of the entire choice set. Varying prices will of course result in varying ideal utility ranks. In the interest of keeping the notation simple, however, we use the same notation throughout and caution the reader when necessary.
The objective of firms in both monopoly and oligopoly settings is to maximize expected revenue. Expected profit maximization-with marginal cost c i per unit of product i-can be easily accommodated. Rewriting the ideal utility as 
Multi-product Monopoly
In this subsection we consider a multi-product monopolist's price optimization problem. The monopolist is offering n products, i = 1, . . . , n, and there is also an outside option, indexed 0, which represents not buying from the monopolist. Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of products, and N + = N ∪ {0} the expanded choice set that includes the outside option. Suppose product i ∈ N yields a random utility
, where z i is exponential with rate λ i , and the outside option yields a random utility U 0 = u 0 − z 0 , where u 0 = α 0 and z 0 is exponential with rate λ 0 .
The monopolist wants to price its products in N optimally -so as to maximize the expected rev- 
subject to the constraint p 0 = 0 without loss of generality. Even if the outside option has a price, it is fixed; therefore, its original price (times β) can be rolled into α 0 and its price reset to 0. Note that, in the latter summation, the ideal utility ranks run from 1 to n + 1 because the choice set N + has n + 1 choices. 
Single-product Oligopoly
In this subsection we consider the price competition among n single-product firms -assuming no outside option. The expected revenue R i (u i ) gained by the firm offering product i ∈ N , expressed as a function of the ideal utility u i , is
where u i ≤ α i (the market size is normalized to 1 without loss of generality). Setting the derivative of this expression to zero reveals that the equilibrium ideal utility must satisfy the first-order
. In order to obtain an analytical characterization of the equilibrium prices, we first study the right-hand-side ratio
. As before, the rank-ordering of ideal utilities matters, and it depends on the price that each and every firm sets. Hence, we analyze
∂u [j] for some ideal utility rank j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, to show that it has three important properties.
Lemma 3. The ratio Q [j] /
∂Q [j] ∂u [j] has the following properties.
(a) Monotonicity and Positivity: It is strictly positive for all j, strictly increasing in u [j] for j ≥ 2, and a constant for j = 1 (locally, preserving the rank-ordering of ideal utilities).
the successive ratios are related as follows:
(c) Independence from Higher-Ranked Ideal Utilities: It is independent of the ideal . . , u [n] and their rank ordering among themselves for j < n.
We build on Lemma 3 to derive Nash equilibrium in prices. Note that part (c) already implies that if one finds the right sequence in which to solve the first-order conditions, right in the sense of producing ordered ideal utilities, one would find a Nash equilibrium. That is, if solving the first-order conditions in the order 1, 2, . . . , n (say) produces optimal ideal utilities in increasing We are now ready to turn to the question of sequence (in which the first-order conditions must be solved) knowing that there can only be one sequence that works. For notational clarity, let
, which is allowed only because the ratio for product [j] depends purely on u [j] and all lower-ranked ideal utilities due to Lemma 3(c). In fact, writing out this ratio explicitly, we observe that the first-order condition for product [j] [l] , boils down to solving a single-variable implicit expression for u [j] (considering u [1] , . . . , u [j−1] as given). Note that, because
, is a constant (it does not even depend on u [1] ), but it does depend on which product is in rank 1 via L [2] .
Next, we analyze the first-order condition for some product [j] for j ≥ 2. Letû [j] denote the solution, i.e., the u [j] that solves
for a given set of lower-ranked ideal utilitiesû 
, thenû [j] ≥û [j−1] , which holds with
Case C: If
Lemma 5 shows there are four mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases that help us compare the 'previous' solution (û [j−1] ) with the 'next' solution (û [j] ). We are particularly interested in whether these two solutions satisfyû [j−1] ≤û [j] , which, as noted before, is needed for a series of first-order condition solutions to support a Nash equilibrium. It is clear that Case A positively helps, Case D positively does not, whereas in Cases B and C it depends. The following necessary condition for equilibrium is thus immediate (we state it without proof). We use the superscript * to denote equilibrium prices or ideal utilities. 
Using Case A of Lemma 5 only, we obtain the following simple procedure that traverses the choice set only once to construct the Nash equilibrium. Step 1. Relabel all products so that
λn (breaking ties arbitrarily), which implies α 1 ≤ α 2 ≤ · · · ≤ α n by assumption.
Step 2. Solve for u 1 that satisfies
Step 3. Successively moving up -for i = 2, i = 3, . . ., and i = n -solve for the unique 
Step 4. Compute the equilibrium prices:
Theorem 6 requires a certain structure on the problem parameters:
for any two products i and i . That is, loosely speaking, larger intrinsic desirability and larger 'error' mean (or standard deviation) imply a larger ideal utility at equilibrium prices.
Albeit not always, a larger ideal utility tends to be associated with a higher equilibrium price. For example, in the following result, a special case of Theorem 6 produces a sharper characterization of the equilibrium. 
Corollary 2. Consider the n-firm oligopoly. Suppose
It follows that revenues in equilibrium are also monotone: Alptekinoğlu and Semple (2016) show for the EC model (λ i = λ for all i) that rank-ordering the products on intrinsic desirability produces the Nash equilibrium (pp. 86-87). Corollary 2 generalizes and expands this result: It generalizes to allow for heteroscedastic errors; and it expands their result by showing that equilibrium prices also have the same ordering. The result is highly intuitive in 2 When n = 2, a weaker condition,
, is sufficient for u * 1 = u * 2 (see Lemma 6 and its proof in the appendix). The duopoly case is fully analyzed in Theorem 7.
that firms with a product that has higher intrinsic desirability and lower variability in the error term is able to charge more and attract more demand, thus gets rewarded more in the market.
Using Lemma 5, oligopoly equilibrium can be characterized in several more special cases. (18) Part (a) of Corollary 3 considers the EC model (it is a special case of Corollary 2). It shows that products with higher intrinsic desirability command a higher price, attract more demand, and yield higher revenue when the error terms are iid. Part (b) shows, when the firms have products with symmetric intrinsic desirability, it is the variability of the error term that drives their success in the market: The firm that has a product with a lower-variance error term (higher λ) wins; it is able to charge a higher price and attract more demand, hence earn a higher revenue, at equilibrium.
Note that higher λ also means a lower mean for the error term; so, those firms with a higher λ can offer consumers a higher expected utility at the same price point p, i.e., E[
Finally, the purely symmetric case yields a very simple solution. Part (c) not only verifies the general intuition that more intense competition (higher n) dampens prices, but it also shows that the equilibrium price is higher for larger variance in error terms (lower λ). The intuition for the latter observation is that higher variance in error terms makes consumer choice less dependent on price (and more on errors), which reduces the competitive pressure on the firms, allowing them to charge more. This result is consistent with what would happen under MNL (Anderson et al. 1992, p. 222) . From the opposite angle, observe that the symmetric equilibrium prices and revenues are decreasing in λ (with lower variance in error terms). It is interesting that all firms lose out even though higher λ means higher expected utility E[U ] = α − βp * − 1/λ = α − [n/ (n − 1)] /λ for the consumers. This has an element of the Prisoner's Dilemma: Giving out better product information seems beneficial from the unilateral perspective of each firm, but it hurts all firms in equilibrium.
Next, adopting Lemma 5 to duopoly, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 7. (Duopoly Equilibrium in Prices)
Suppose n = 2 and α 1 + 1/λ 1 ≤ α 2 + 1/λ 2 (breaking any tie arbitrarily). Then, the unique Nash equilibrium prices are
wherep 2 is the unique solution of
that satisfies 1/(βλ 1 ) ≤p 2 ≤ 1/(βλ 2 ) + (α 2 − α 1 ) /β. Furthermore, the ideal utilities at equilibrium prices satisfy u * 1 ≤ u * 2 , and the resulting choice probabilities and expected revenues in equilibrium are as follows.
Note that the ranking of ideal utilities at equilibrium prices matches how a particular sum (α i +1/λ i ) ranks between the two choices. A lower ideal utility (at equilibrium prices) accompanies a lower sum of intrinsic desirability and standard deviation of error term. Also, comparing equilibrium revenues, we observe that firm 1 earns a higher revenue than firm 2 if and only if it can also charge a higher price at equilibrium, i.e.,
≥p 2 ). A sufficient condition for firm 1 to earn a higher revenue is α 1 ≥ α 2 . That is, if it has a product with higher intrinsic desirability (α 1 ≥ α 2 ) and a low-variance error term compared to competition, i.e.,
Are there cases where lower variance in error term surely leads to market advantage -higher price and revenue in equilibrium? To answer this we analyze two special cases of duopoly. We show in both cases that the product with lower variance (higher λ) commands a higher price and earns a higher revenue at equilibrium. In other words, interpreting lower variance as better product information, the firm that gives better product information gets rewarded in the market. Corollary 4 shows, when the firms have products with symmetric intrinsic desirability, it is the variance of the error term that drives their success in the market: The firm that has the product with a lower-variance error term wins; it is able to charge a higher price and earn a higher revenue at equilibrium. 
This result is also consistent with Corollary 4 in that lower variance in error term (higher λ) leads to market advantage. This case can be viewed as a quasi-symmetric duopoly, because the ideal utilities at equilibrium prices are equal:
Naturally, the ratios Q * 1 /λ 1 and Q * 2 /λ 2 also match.
Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this research is to build a case for using HEC in demand modeling in theoretical and empirical research. We present a number of new analytical properties of this choice model, including closed-form demand elasticity and consumer surplus expressions, and logconcavity of the likelihood function in utility model parameters (for a given set of error term distribution parameters).
We also study pricing under HEC in two canonical demand models, one for a monopoly offering n products to consumers who also have an outside option, and the other for an oligopoly of n firms each offering a single product. Higher variability in error terms generally soften the price competition, but it also is detrimental for individual firm profits.
Appendix: Proofs Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Plugging in the pdf and cdf of the error terms into (1), recognizing that they equal zero over the nonpositive domain, and adopting the notation (x) + = x for x ≥ 0, 0 for x < 0, we have
can be written more explicitly as
Integrating and simplifying each term, we obtain the following, which can be expressed more compactly as in (3).
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the proof of a similar result for EC (Alptekinoğlu and Semple, 2016 , Online Supplement, Lemma 3). First, observe that Q [j] can be factored into the following form: ..., u [n] ). Then Q [j] can be expressed in the general form
where a 0 , a 1 , ...., a j−1 are n×1 vectors that capture the coefficients of u in the exponents of equation (20), and γ k are constants satisfying 0
is a convex function of u satisfying 0 < f (u) < 1. Then we must have
It is enough to show ln (1 − f (u)) is concave. But this is straightforward; its Hessian is
which is negative definite because f (u) is convex.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Continuity follows from
for j = 1, . . . , n − 1 (see §2.1). As for differentiability, suppose the ideal utilities u 1 ≤ u 2 ≤ · · · ≤ u n are ordered, i.e.,
[j] = j ∀j. Differentiability is assured when this rank-ordering of ideal utilities is preserved; the first derivatives are given in (10). The own-derivative is
for all non-transition points at which ideal utility ranks remain as presumed. Now, pick a choice i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, and consider the point at which its ideal utility crosses that of choice i − 1. The limiting value of the above partial derivative as u i approaches u i−1 from above (right-limit) is
This follows from the fact that 
whereG [i−1] andQ [i−1] denote the new G-and Q-functions for choice i, which is now at rank i − 1 (because u i ≤ u i−1 ). Note that, for choice i after swapping, λ [i−1] = λ i (error terms are non-iid and go with the choice) and
Careful bookkeeping also reveals that
. Thus, the left-limit (22) exactly equals the right-limit (21). A similar argument applies to the derivative as u i approaches u i+1 . The partial derivative ∂Q i /∂u i therefore exists everywhere for all i. Finally, the cross-derivatives
also exist everywhere for all i = i , because Q i and Q i are themselves continuous (Lemma 2).
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The cdf of consumer surplus S ≡ max i∈N {U i } can be written compactly as follows:
To write H(s) more explicitly, and use it in deriving the expected value of S, we need to keep track of where s falls with respect to u-values. In particular, letting u 0 = −∞,
Using h(·), we write the expected value of S as
Applying integration by parts to these n terms, and letting
Cancelling the u [k] ∆ k terms and using Theorem 1, we obtain
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Without loss of generality we focus on a single choice scenario S = {1, 2, . . . , n} with n products and suppress the scenario index k. We show that ln (Q i ) is a concave function of the parameter vector γ for a fixed set of λ's. Recall that the ideal utility ranks of products (how u i (γ) rank among the products in S, i ∈ S) change as a function of model parameters γ, and those ranks in turn enter into the choice probability formula Q [j] , hence the choice probabilities Q i . Observe that if no product changes its rank on this interval, the result is clearly true; it is a direct consequence of Lemma 1 and the fact that all ideal utility functions are linear in γ. If the ideal utility functions for two products cross (if the two products "swap ranks") at some point, say µ = µ (a "transition point"), we know from Lemma 2 that ln (Q i ) is still differentiable at µ = µ . Although we assume that only two ideal utility functions cross at the same time, the case where more than two cross simultaneously can be reduced to the case for two using a routine perturbation argument; taking the limit as these perturbations tend to 0 implies the result.
The total derivative of Q i with respect to µ therefore exists and is
The latter is a continuous function of µ at µ = µ because each term in the sum is continuous (note u i is a linear function of µ); this implies the derivative of ln (Q i ) is continuous at µ = µ too.
Because ln (Q i ) is concave on each subinterval where no rank transitions take place by Lemma 1 and differentiable at each point where a rank transition does take place by Lemma 2, the function must be concave on the entire interval [0, 1]. The loglikelihood function is a nonnegatively weighted combination of such functions, and this ensures its concavity.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Plugging in the pdf and cdf of the error terms into (15), recognizing that they equal zero over the nonpositive domain, and adopting the notation (x) + = x for x ≥ 0, 0 for x < 0, we have
can be expressed more explicitly as
Integrating and simplifying, we obtain the following expression, which can be expressed more compactly as in (17).
The choice probability for the outside option is almost immediate from (16):
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Arguing by contradiction, suppose there exist products i and i such that Q i > Q i and yet
Consider the new revenue by resetting prices for i and i as follows:
β . These price changes preserve the values for the ideal utility vector (as u i (p i ) = L and u i (p i ) = H) but interchange the choice probabilities associated with product i and product i . Because there is no change in the expected revenue contribution for any product other than i or i , the net change in total expected revenue
is strictly positive, which follows from the premise. This contradicts the optimality of the original expected revenue.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Recall the definition
and how Q [j] and ∂Q [j] ∂u [j] can be expressed in terms of the G functions:
Proof of Lemma 3(a): Strict positivity follows from Q [j] and ∂Q [j] ∂u [j] above. Due to Lemma 1,
is logconcave (locally, preserving the rank-ordering of ideal utilities), which implies ∂Q [j] ∂u [j] /Q [j] is monotone nonincreasing and hence the reciprocal is nondecreasing. For strict monotonicity, note that the derivative of the ratio, 1
, which is strictly positive except for j = 1 (because, G [j] > Q [j] for j > 1, and
Proof of Lemma 3(b):
, we have the relationship
(this was shown earlier in §2.1). It also implies the following iff
(the condition is used in line 3). The result follows from
It holds with strict inequality iff λ [j] < λ [j−1] .
Proof of Lemma 3(c):
This can be confirmed by writing out the ratio and noting that every term in the numerator and the denominator depends on u [j+1] , . . . , u [n] through the common factor exp(− n k=j+1 λ [k] u [k] ). In particular, this common factor cancels out from G [1] , . . . , G [j] that appear both in the numerator and the denominator. Furthermore, λ [j+1] , . . . , λ [n] appear only as a sum . . , L [j] , L [j+1] terms), therefore the ratio is also independent of how higher-ranked ideal utilities rank among themselves.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Suppose [i] = i and set m = 1. The first and second derivatives of the expected revenue with respect to price are
which can be verified using (9) and (10). Evaluating ∂ 2 R i /∂p 2 i at any point where the first-order-
which is strictly negative. The revenue function is therefore strictly quasi-concave for all i ∈ N , meaning, there is a unique best response denoted by p * i (p 1 , . . . , p i−1 , p i+1 , . . . , p n ) to any vector of prices set by other firms. If this best response function is a contraction, i.e., j =i |∂p * i /∂p j | < 1 for all i ∈ N , then the equilibrium must also be unique (by Theorem 3.4 of Friedman, 1990, p. 84 
Applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order-condition (∂R i /∂p i = 0) and evaluating the result along the best response function, we obtain
3 Friedman (1990) shows it is sufficient for uniqueness that every player has (1) a compact and convex strategy space; (2) a continuous, bounded and strictly quasiconcave payoff function; and (3) a best-response function that is a contraction (Theorem 3.4, p. 84) . Our proof verifies (2) and (3). We omit (1) for brevity. Although, technically, prices can be anywhere in [0, ∞), firm i's strategy space can be taken as [0, Pi] , which is compact (closed and bounded) and convex, for some sufficiently large constant Pi.
This inequality holds because its left-hand-side is equal to one of the two strictly positive terms on the right-hand-side, i.e.,
, which follows from (4).
In the derivation above, normalizing the market size (m = 1) is without loss of generality.
(Any fixed market size m would multiply the first and second derivatives stated in the beginning, and it eventually cancels out from ∂p * i /∂p j .) The assumption of [i] = i, however, was mainly for expositional convenience, but it also implicitly imposes a requirement (for derivatives to be valid) that all the ideal utility ranks remain the same, which of course may not be true as prices vary.
Changes in ideal utility ranks do not pose a problem due to Lemma 2; the above argument holds for any ranking of ideal utilities (including the equilibrium ranking), and it follows from Lemma 2 that choice probabilities, hence firm revenues, are continuous and differentiable in ideal utilities, hence in prices.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. By Theorem 5,
Take any i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and suppose
, which is in contradiction with the fact that Q i ≤ Q i+1 and λ i ≥ λ i+1 imply the opposite. Thus, by contradiction, it must be that
this relationship must hold for all products, implying [i] = i -that the ideal utility ordering of products at optimal prices is the same as their intrinsic desirability ordering.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. The solution to (18) is unique, because the left-hand-side is strictly decreasing in u [j] and equal to zero for u [j] = α [j] , and the right-hand-side is strictly positive and strictly increasing in u [j] due to Lemma 3(a).
Our proof strategy involves comparing . . ,û [j−1] ), then it must be thatû [j] >û [j−1] , because the left-hand-side of (18) is strictly decreasing in u [j] and the right-hand-side of (18) is strictly positive and strictly increasing in u [j] . On the contrary, if (Cases A and B) . There are three possibilities.
The first line is because α [j−1] ≤ α [j] ; the second line is becauseû [j−1] solves its version of the first-order condition; the last line follows from Lemma 3(b) and the assumption that
Hence, we have α
where the last line is becauseû [j−1] solves its version of the first-order condition, and the second line is due to Lemma 3(b) and the assumption that λ [j] ≥ λ [j−1] . The first inequality then follows from comparing the difference . . ,û [j−2] ), which equals
using the relationships derived in the proof of Lemma 3(b). It can be shown that
where the first inequality follows from
. The second inequality holds true, because it is equivalent -using (23) -to . . ,û [j−1] ), which impliesû [j] ≥û [j−1] , and these hold with equality only if α [j−1] = α [j] and λ [j−1] 
where the first line is becauseû [j−1] solves its version of the first-order condition, the second line follows from α [j−1] > α [j] , and the third line is due to Lemma 3(b) and the assumption that
which can be shown -using (23) -to be equivalent to inequality (19).
Now assume α
(Cases C and D). Again, there are three possibilities.
where the first line is becauseû [j−1] solves its version of the first-order condition, the second line follows from α [j−1] ≤ α [j] , and the third line is due to Lemma 3(b) and the assumption that
The first line is because α [j−1] > α [j] ; the second line is becauseû [j−1] solves its version of the first-order condition; the last line follows from Lemma 3(b) and the assumption that λ [j−1] < λ [j] .
Hence, we have α [j] 
where the first line is becauseû [j−1] solves its version of the first-order condition, and the second line is due to Lemma 3(b) and the assumption that λ [j−1] ≥ λ [j] . The last inequality then follows from comparing the difference . . ,û [j−1] ). It can be shown that
, and the second from (23) and . . . ,û [j−1] ), which impliesû [j] <û [j−1] .
A summary of all the different cases regarding whetherû [j−1] ≤û [j] ("Yes") or not are given in Table 2 for the reader's convenience.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. First, note that in Step 3 the right-hand-side of the first-order condition only depends on u i and the u's that have been determined so far (u * 1 , . . . , u the procedure can proceed sequentially and solve for one u at a time. However, for the choice probabilities and their derivatives, which make up the right-hand-side, to be well-defined, we need the whole solution to satisfy u * 1 ≤ u * 2 ≤ · · · ≤ u * n .
Consider
Step 3 for product i, which involves solving the first-order condition for u i given u * 1 , . . . , u * i−1 (they were determined in i − 1 previous iterations of Step 3 and suppose they satisfy Therefore, this sequential procedure naturally orders the optimal ideal utilities u * 1 ≤ u * 2 ≤ · · · ≤ u * n by construction. For the resulting prices to be a Nash equilibrium, we further claim that no firm has an incentive to deviate from their optimal ideal utility. This follows from Lemma 3(c).
The procedure starts with the product that has the lowest ideal utility and works its way up one firm at a time; when their 'turn' comes, each firm sets their own optimal ideal utility with the full knowledge of all products with smaller ideal utilities, and the higher ideal utilities that stem from the pricing decisions of the remaining firms have no impact on their decision. Thus, the construction does indeed produce a Nash equilibrium in ideal utilities, and therefore prices.
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. for all i ≥ 1. Second, using the first-order condition for product i + 1, we obtain
which yields the following equations after replacing σ i−1 · exp(−L i u * i ) with
based on the first-order condition for product i.
Now, plugging (25) into (24), we conclude that Q * i ≥ Q * i+1 iff
which is valid for all i ≥ 1, because we assumed λ 1 ≥ λ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ λ n and showed earlier that p * 1 ≥ p * 2 ≥ · · · ≥ p * n . 
Part (c):

Proof of Theorem 7
First, adopting Lemma 5 to duopoly, we obtain the following result; Cases A and B of Lemma 5 collapse into one, and so do Cases C and D. . This also meansû [2] <û [1] in Case C.
The argument for Case D remains the same.
We now prove the theorem using Lemma 6. . Now, relabeling the products such that α 1 + 1/λ 1 ≤ α 2 + 1/λ 2 , the price pair p * i = (α i − u * i ) /β (i = 1, 2) implied by the ideal utilities u * 1 = α 1 − 1/λ 2 and u * 2 , which satisfies α 2 − u * 2 = τ 2 (u * 2 |u * 1 ), is the unique Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, u * 2 ≥ u * 1 , which holds with equality only if α 1 + 1/λ 1 = α 2 + 1/λ 2 .
